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Highlights
• As of today, the institutional architecture of Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) looks more like the hybrid sum of ad-hoc 
institutions rather than a clear, lean and functional decision-making 
regime. Its peculiar shape is by and large a legacy of the euro crisis and 
results from the short-sighted institutional change that ran in paral-
lel to the euro crisis management. Against this background, it is not 
surprising to see that ‘complexity of policy making’ has been identified 
by the European Commission as an area where improvement should 
be made in the future1.  
• This policy brief makes the case for streamlining EMU’s govern-
ance with a view to making it simpler and more effective. Unlike 
other contributions which focused on consolidating this institutional 
chaos via a quantum leap into a ‘deeper EMU’ or a ‘genuine EMU’, 
this policy brief suggests instead that the burning priority should be 
to address EMU’s growing complexity, leaving aside the wider philo-
sophic discussion revolving around the possible future of EMU as an 
autonomous polity. ‘Simpler EMU’, it argues, should be within the EU 
leadership’s reach. 
• Ten months ago, the EU embarked on a new policy cycle (2014-2019), 
with new leaders at its command and new priorities set. A well-func-
tioning EMU features high among the issues topping Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s agenda, only a few miles away from better regulation. Now 
that the storm of the financial crisis is over, there are indeed no valid 
reasons left to kick the can down the road any further. Moreover, given 
the current populist pressures to re-nationalize European policies, it 
should not be taken for granted that the window of opportunity for 
institutional re-engineering will be open for too long. 
• Among the many institutional reforms which could be conducted, 
this paper advocates a rationalization of EMU’s governance on three 
fronts: the Euro-Summit; the Eurogroup and the EU’s financial assis-
tance function. 
1. Communication on the “Review of 6 Pack and 2 Pack”, 28 November 2014.
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Recommendations
1. Simplifying and consolidating EMU’s governance 
should be a priority of the Juncker Commission. 
While the imperatives of ‘hard times’ was an argument 
for short-term institutional engineering and the multi-
plication of late night meetings, (relatively) calmer times 
should be used to bring coherence, efficiency and clarity 
to Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union.
2. Abolish the Euro-Summit. Operating in the shadow 
of two more routinized and established institutions (the 
European Council and the Eurogroup), the added-value 
of Euro-Summits’ is disputed. As a matter of fact, the Euro-
Summit met only once per year over the last four years, 
proof if any where required that it is not that useful a 
forum as its advocates like to think.
3. Clarify the scope of action and the functions of the 
Eurogroup compared to the ECOFIN, recognizing that 
the Eurogroup is now a permanent EMU institution which 
is there to stay. To take this change into account, its field 
of action, exact competences and reporting procedures 
should therefore be clearly defined in a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the ECOFIN. Moreover, the func-
tion of Eurogroup president should become full time and 
Brussels-based as this would help to lift the opacity of the 
Eurogroup’s tasks.
4. Consolidate the EMU’s financial assistance function 
currently split between the European Commission, 
the Eurogroup and the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM). Swift action should be undertaken to ensure 
that the ESM does not become locked-in as an intergov-
ernmental agency in the wider EMU polity.
1. Introduction
This policy brief makes the case for streamlining the 
governance of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), recognizing that the euro crisis was also an insti-
tutional crisis – on top of being both a banking and a 
sovereign debt crisis. Unlike recent treatments of EMU’s 
governance flaws such as the assessments provided by 
the Glienicker Group, the Eiffel Group and the Euro2030 
Group2, this examination will not focus on the consti-
tutional shape of a full-fledge euro union, with a euro 
area finance minister at its helm, backed up by an EMU 
treasury that would oversee a true fiscal capacity. Indeed, 
2. http://www.glienickergruppe.eu ; http://www.groupe-eiffel.eu; http://
www.euro2030.eu
it reckons that while slogans like ‘deeper EMU’ or ‘gen-
uine EMU’ are likely to stay on the agenda, it is doubtful 
that the Juncker Commission will be ready to sacrifice 
political capital on such an ambitious reshuffling in the 
near term. This note therefore argues that the burning 
priority should be to address EMU’s growing complexity. 
A ‘simpler EMU’, it concludes, should be within the EU’s 
reach and could constitute a first step in the overall con-
solidation exercise which has been recently announced in 
the Five Presidents Report on Completing EMU3.
In its early days, i.e. in the early/mid 1990s, EMU’s 
economic governance was uncomplicated and rather 
straightforward. The ECOFIN, the EU Council forma-
tion in charge of economic and financial affairs, would 
take care of the coordination of euro area members’ fiscal 
policies under a rather simple set of rules, the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Upon the creation of the Euro-
group in 1997, EMU’s governance evolved into a slightly 
more intricate construct, a tendency reinforced by the 
SGP reform in 2005. The latter aimed at injecting more 
flexibility and fairness into the EU’s fiscal surveillance 
regime. De facto, it also increased the Pact’s obscurity. 
The decisive blow to EMU’s simplicity came however 
with the euro crisis, in 2009. 
In effect, EMU’s ‘light’ economic governance was not up 
to speed for dealing with such an overwhelming set of 
events, leading to what was time and again referred to 
as a ‘too little too late’ crisis management pattern. To fill 
EMU’s institutional void, a vast institutional and regula-
tory change occurred and resulted in EMU’s governance 
becoming layered with new competences, institutions 
and instruments, in turn producing higher complexity 
and higher ambiguity. This has pushed EMU’s govern-
ance into a corner, with only a few experts left to under-
stand its exact nature and logic. To be sure, there is no 
mistaking the evidence that, taken individually, the var-
ious institutional choices made (e.g. creation of the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism, Fiscal Compact, Euro Sum-
mits; strengthening of the European Council and of the 
Eurogroup) represented flexible and logical solutions for 
policy-makers operating under time pressure. Yet, while 
the imperatives of ‘hard times’ was an argument for short-
term institutional engineering and the short-sighted mul-
tiplication of late night meetings, calmer times should be 
used to bring more clarity and effectiveness to Europe’s 
3. http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presi-
dents-report_en.pdf
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Economic and Monetary Union. Simplifying and con-
solidating EMU’s governance should hence be a priority 
of the new EU leadership.  Just as ‘better regulation’ ranks 
high on the agenda of the Juncker Commission, so too 
should ‘better governance’. And indeed, ‘complexity of 
policy making’ has been identified recently by the Euro-
pean Commission as an area where improvement should 
be made in the future4.
This paper focuses on three institutional features which 
have recently increased the complexity and opacity of 
EMU’s governance: the intriguing Euro-Summit, the 
omnipresent yet informal Eurogroup and EMU’s frag-
mented financial assistance function. 
2. The Euro-Summits: a solution now 
looking for a problem? 
The European Council has been at the core of the euro 
crisis management, taking up an executive and coordi-
nation role, thereby putting itself right on top of EMU’s 
governance5. The corollary of this informal change was 
a high meeting frequency. The European Council met 
no less than 26 times over the period 2010-2013, be it 
in extraordinary, informal or regular format. To put the 
figure in perspective, this amounts to six to seven meet-
ings per year with an average of one European Council 
every 7 weeks (if we exclude July and August when no 
meetings are usually held). This frenetic meeting habit 
constitutes a strong departure in EMU governance prac-
tices from the previous regularised pattern of two meet-
ings per semester, a norm confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty 
although the latter also foresees that the President may 
convene extraordinary meetings, ‘when the situation so 
requires’ . The fact that Van Rompuy’s successor, President 
Donald Tusk committed to holding European Council 
meetings within a day (compared to two consecutive days 
previously) is a sign that this interaction pattern cannot 
serve as an efficient model for the future.
Since a few years, heads of State and governments also 
meet in another format, called the Euro Summit. This 
practice dates back to October 2008, at the beginning 
4. Economic governance review - Report on the application of Regulations 
(EU) n° 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 
and 473/20131 -  also known as the “review of 6 Pack and 2 Pack”, 28 
November 2014.
5. See Uwe Puetter, The European Council and Deliberative Intergovern-
mentalism, Oxford University Press, 2014.
of the financial crisis, when euro area leaders started to 
gather informally – on French insistence. The rationale 
was to foster policy coordination among euro area 
leaders and to provide a forum for discussion on the 
design of financial assistance mechanisms. This informal 
meeting setup was later formalised as part of the Fiscal 
Compact. Now that the acuteness of the financial crisis 
has ebbed down – despite the uncertainties surrounding 
the Greek situation – and that the financial instruments 
are up and running, it is time to ask what the raison d’être 
and merit of Euro Summits exactly is. In truth, what is 
striking when one lists up its key contributions, is that 
it seems to create more problems than it solves: (1) the 
Euro Summit’s existence has notoriously exacerbated the 
conflict between euro area leaders (‘ins’) and non-euro 
area leaders (‘outs’); (2) its added-value compared to both 
the European Council and the Eurogroup – two more 
established and routinized institutions – is unclear; (3) its 
continuation prolongs an inefficient, intergovernmental 
governance pattern centred around a high-frequency of 
meetings. 
At the height of the crisis, in a moment of serenity, euro 
area leaders had however recognized the growing com-
plexity of EMU’s governance as a chief problem and 
pursued some formalization initiatives to address it. Yet, 
instead of abolishing the informal practice of euro sum-
mits, the key action adopted was the commitment that 
Euro Summit meetings should take place ‘at least twice 
a year’ with a view to ‘defin(ing) strategic orientations 
for the conduct of economic policies and for improved 
competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro 
area’6. Since then, the Euro Summits have however only 
formally convened four times: on 29 June 2012, on 14 
March 2013, on 24 October 2014 and on 22 June 2015 
– i.e. once per year – fuelling claims that the preparation 
of its agendas is provoking quite some head-scratching. 
With a former Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, and 
as such non-euro area member, serving as European 
Council President and as President of Euro Summits it 
is to be expected that Euro-Summits will provoke fur-
ther headaches. Or who knows, it might pave the way 
for a simple move: its ultimate abolishment. After all, if 
more coordination is needed at euro area level, this can 
be done as part of the Eurogroup, leaving out unresolved 
and hence controversial issues to the European Council. 
6. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/125644.pdf
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The latter would in turn, take up again its traditional role 
of ‘arbiter of last-resort’7, thus putting an end to the duali-
zation of the euro’s governance (see figure 1 below) which 
occurred during the euro crisis.
3. The Eurogroup is now a permanent 
EMU executive; let’s clarify its action 
scope
The Eurogroup, which brings together Finance Ministers 
of the euro area in a monthly meeting held over dinner 
(on the eve of the ECOFIN meeting) has seen its scope 
and function extended during the euro crisis. It strongly 
departed from its minimalistic role codified in the Lisbon 
Treaty where the emphasis lies on its informality and on 
its deliberative character. The true nature of the Euro-
group as of today is therefore rather confusing. The ambi-
guity used to be captured by the Eurogroup’s official web 
portal definition which portrayed it as ‘the main forum 
for the management of the single currency area’ although 
“forum” and “management” appear to be contradic-
tory functions.  Its new definition looks as an attempt to 
reduce the contradiction8. 
Ever since its creation in December 1997, the Eurogroup 
experienced several stages of institutionalization. In Sep-
tember 2004, its members decided that the group should 
have a permanent chairman elected for a period of two 
and a half years. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty formalized 
this change in a rather curious way as it recognized - in 
a protocol annexed to the Treaty - that ‘the ministers of 
the Member States whose currency is the euro shall meet 
informally’.  The October 2011 Euro Summit statement, 
referred above, was the latest milestone in the Eurogroup’s 
institutionalization. It included two provisions of key 
relevance for its future development. First, it mentioned 
that the Euro Working Group, the euro area spin-off of 
the Economic and Financial Committee and preparatory 
body of the Eurogroup (see figure below), would see its 
chairman appointed full-time and become Brussels-based, 
a reflection of the growing power of this body which has 
been particularly active during the critical moments of the 
7. Jeremy John Richardson, European Union: Power and Policy-Making, 
Routledge, 2005.
8. ‘The Eurogroup is an informal body where the ministers of the euro area 
member states discuss matters relating to their shared responsibilities 
related to the euro’ accessed on http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
council-eu/eurogroup/.
crisis9. Second, EU leaders seized this occasion to put the 
future of the Eurogroup president on the agenda, clearly 
stressing that ‘a decision on whether he/she should be (…) 
a full-time President based in Brussels will be taken at the 
time of the expiry of the mandate of the current incum-
bent’ (i.e. Jean-Claude Juncker). 
Figure 1: EMU’s dual governance
However, while the first provision was followed by action 
in January 2012, when Austrian national Thomas Wieser 
was appointed both Chairman of the Economic and 
Financial Committee and chairman of the Euro Working 
Group, the second commitment went unheeded. Mean-
while, rumours pointing at a possible merger of respon-
sibilities of the Eurogroup president and of the Commis-
sion’s economic and monetary affairs portfolio come and 
go. Yet, the fusion of functions has disappeared from the 
agenda ever since and political will to address the chal-
lenge has dropped to zero. However, such a fusion would 
be a welcomed move. Turning the job of Eurogroup presi-
dent into a full-time, Brussels-based job (in line with the 
October 2011 commitment) would tap on economies of 
scale, would consolidate competences within fewer hands 
and most importantly, would ensure that the decisions 
taken by the Eurogroup will be incarnated publicly by 
a single and identifiable person. This figure will then be 
pressured by public opinions to report on discussions and 
such a move would undoubtedly help to clarify who does 
what on economic governance. This reform would also be 
consistent with the resource commitment required to per-
form the job. Jean-Claude Juncker, its former Chairman 
argued in favour of a full-time Eurogroup head, and once 
declared that the job was ‘taking half of [his] working time 
as prime minister’.  Despite its merits, this turnaround will 
9. Antoine Kasel, in ‘Le système présidentiel de l’Union européenne après 
Lisbonne’, ENA, 2012.
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however not suffice to clarify the responsibilities of the 
Eurogroup as an institution. 
Indeed, the crisis saw the Eurogroup moving out of the 
shadow of the ECOFIN, regularly deciding on matters 
of economic policy. The second Greek bail-out, to name 
the example of this 130bn euros decision was made in 
this arena. So was the controversial decision to tax small 
Cypriot deposit owners to bail-out its banks, a Eurogroup 
decision. Moreover, one should also recall that de facto, 
the Eurogroup also happens to serve as the board of gov-
ernors of the European Stability Mechanism since the 
members of the two distinct structures overlap one to one. 
As such the Eurogroup overlooks the disbursement of 
financial assistance to member states experiencing severe 
financial difficulties. This makes it an indisputably central 
EMU executive institution. A collateral damage of this 
institutional conversion of the Eurogroup, has been that 
the ECOFIN has become, on many issue areas, a rubber 
stamp of the Eurogroup’s agreements. Further clarifica-
tion on the Eurogroup’s exact role as part of EMU’s eco-
nomic governance will therefore be needed sooner or 
later. While it is obvious that a true formalization of the 
Eurogroup would require Treaty change, currently per-
ceived as highly costly by European heads of state and 
government, this note recommends that exact compe-
tences, field of action and reporting procedures should be 
clearly delineated in a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the ECOFIN as it is key that the Eurogroup’s autono-
mous decision areas are identified compared to the ones 
of the ECOFIN. 
4. EMU’s financial assistance remains 
fragmented between the Commission 
and the Eurogroup
Financial assistance is another area where the tension 
between the Eurogroup and the European Commission 
can be observed. The challenge ahead is however of a 
slightly different nature in this instance. Instead of sim-
plifying a decision-making regime, the simplification 
task consists of addressing the current fragmentation of 
EMU’s ‘big bazooka’, whose effective firepower is crucial 
for the sustainability, credibility and financial stability of 
the euro. As of today, EMU’s financial assistance func-
tion remains indeed split between two distinct actors: the 
European Commission on the one hand, who operates the 
Balance of Payments (BoP) assistance and the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) on the other, who operates 
both the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
the ESM. A brief contextualisation of the design of these 
new instruments is however in order before looking at 
possible reform plans.
During one of the defining moments of the euro crisis 
response, i.e. the week-end of the 9-10 May 2010, EU 
leaders agreed to design financial assistance instruments 
to support euro area members experiencing financial dif-
ficulties. Complementing the already existing BoP assis-
tance which has been enhanced during the crisis10, two 
policy instruments were thus successively created. They 
earned awful names: the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) (later turned into the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).  While the first of these funds remains 
financed by the EU budget and operated by the European 
Commission, the second taps into EMU member states’ 
own resources and is managed, under the supervision of 
the Eurogroup, by the ESM from its headquarter in Lux-
emburg (see the table below for a brief overview).
Such a repartition of tasks between the Commission and 
the Eurogroup was not the spirit of the initial proposal 
made by the Commission. Indeed the latter had sug-
gested being completely in charge of managing financial 
assistance. Yet, due to the very limited EU resources, the 
Commission proposal foresaw that two distinct instru-
ments would be set up: (1) a small instrument based on 
an EU budget guarantee, later known as the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM); and (2) a large 
instrument based on Member States’ guarantees, a sort 
of extension of the concept underpinning the Greek 
bilateral loan facility. Nonetheless, both would have been 
managed by the Commission. However, the EU Coun-
cil’s legal service identified at the time that this proposal 
would go against the letter of the Treaty as the latter does 
not foresee the possibility for the European Union to have 
its own resources. As a result, a special purpose vehicle 
(the European Financial Stability Facility) came to life, 
based on an intergovernmental agreement. This intergov-
ernmental pattern was to be repeated at later stages of the 
euro crisis to circumvent Treaty constraints, veto players 
or domestic pressures. 
10. From € 12 bn before the crisis, the instrument has been increased to € 25 
bn  in December 2008 and to € 50 bn in May 2009.
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While the rationale for such an approach is straightfor-
ward in hard times, EMU’s tendency towards ad-hoc 
institutional engineering will also have lasting and inef-
ficient fragmentation effects.  If there is indeed one lesson 
to be learned from European integration history is that 
path-dependency matters. As new institutions are cre-
ated, they tend to acquire new resources, develop their 
own preferences and expansion strategies and in the end, 
become locked-in the institutional landscape until they 
become obsolete. Such a process has already started with 
the ESM. It may have come unnoticed, but more than two 
years after its inauguration, the ESM has now grown into 
a 130 staff strong institution that increasingly looks like a 
debt agency. And it is expanding further as the number 
of open vacancies advertised over the last year indicates. 
Admittedly, this is still minor compared to the size of the 
Commission’s DG ECFIN (around 680 staff) and thus 
leaves no doubt as to the winner in case of a take-over.
Since fragmentation does not provide any helpful guide 
for the future, consolidation work should be undertaken 
to undo the useless duplication of tasks invented during 
the crisis. Which way out could be contemplated? In our 
view, two options can be envisaged. The first best would 
be to merge the three financial assistance instruments and 
consolidating then into the hands of the only Community 
actor in the game: the Commission. This would provide 
economies of scale as well as a higher financial leverage. 
On top of this, the decision making process would be the 
standard EU decision making process which also implies 
accountability towards the European Parliament. Com-
pared to the current opacity of the Eurogroup’s delibera-
tions about the activation of ESM financial assistance, 
this would be a clear way forward. However, such a pro-
posal would necessitate Treaty change. To go around this 
constraint, a second option could thus be considered: to 
create an intergovernmental European debt agency which 
would regroup the three instruments and mutualize 
resources on financial assistance.  As DG ECFIN already 
holds staff in Luxembourg, the ESM would not even need 
to be transferred to Brussels, thus preventing any risks 
of business continuity. Incrementally, this agency could 
turn and expand into a European Monetary Fund, a con-
cept proposed by Gros and Mayer during the euro crisis11. 
At least, these two options should be further investigated. 
If this issue is disregarded, it is to be feared that path 
dependency and mutually reinforcing dynamics will be 
unravelling. Granted, some consolidation has been per-
formed already, when the EFSF was absorbed into the 
ESM in July 2013, ensuring that the EFSF would no longer 
be mobilized for new financial assistance programmes. 
Yet, the issue remains that  if no attempt at merging the 
ESM with the EFSM and the BoP were conducted over 
the next few years, chances are high – knowing the sticki-
ness of EU governance and its unfortunate tendency to 
make the temporary permanent – that economies of scale 
and the consolidation of EU financial assistance will not 
happen any time soon. In this case, instead of a larger 
firepower, one should rather expect an increasing inter-
institutional competition between the Commission and 
the Eurogroup’s agency (the ESM), to the benefit of no 
one. The 5 Presidents Report mentions the idea of ‘inte-
grating the ESM into the EU law framework’12. Unfortu-
nately, the implementation of this step is back-loaded to 
stage 2 and should thus be implemented by 2025. 
11. ht tp://w w w.ceps.eu/system/f i les/book/2010/02/No%20202%20
EMF%20e-version%20update%2017%20May.pdf
12. http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presi-
dents-report_en.pdf
Table 1: Overview of EMU’s financial assistance instruments
Name of the instrument Financial capacity Actor operating it
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 60 bn euros European Commission
Balance of Payment assistance (BoP)  50 bn euros European Commission
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), taking over from the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF)
500 bn euros European Stability Mechanism
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3. Clarify the scope of action and the functions of 
the Eurogroup compared to the ECOFIN, recog-
nizing that the Eurogroup is now a permanent EMU 
institution which is there to stay. The Eurogroup has 
acted as its executive arm during the euro crisis and 
now occupies central stage in EMU. It is no longer 
an informal, deliberative and non-deciding body. 
To take into account this change, its field of action, 
exact competences and reporting procedures should 
therefore be clearly defined in a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the ECOFIN. Moreover, the 
function of Eurogroup president should become a 
full time, Brussels-based job as this would help to lift 
the opacity of the Eurogroup’s tasks.
4. Consolidate the EMU’s financial assistance func-
tion currently split between the European Com-
mission, the Eurogroup and the ESM. Swift action 
should be undertaken to ensure that the ESM does 
not become locked-in as an intergovernmental 
agency in the wider EMU polity.
Progressing on these aspects in an endeavour to ration-
alize EMU’s institutional architecture would contribute to 
simplify EMU’s governance while making it more effec-
tive. Ideally, this would be only the beginning of a vast 
reconstruction work as many other institutional incon-
sistencies and duplications will need to be addressed 
within EMU.  Another obvious candidate for further 
work is the Fiscal Compact, given its intergovernmental 
nature and its partial overlap with the provisions of the 
Six Pack.
5.  Conclusion
This policy brief made the case for streamlining and 
consolidating the governance of Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). As it is now, EMU’s institu-
tional architecture looks indeed more like a patchwork 
of solidified ad-hoc solutions rather than a clear and 
functional decision-making regime. This is the legacy of 
a short-sighted institutional change that ran in parallel to 
the euro crisis management. Unlike other contributions 
which focused on consolidating this institutional chaos 
into a ‘deeper EMU’ or ‘genuine EMU’, this policy brief 
suggested instead that the burning priority should be to 
address EMU’s growing complexity. ‘Simpler EMU’, it 
argued, should be within the new EU leadership’s reach. 
In this regard, the paper made four headline recommen-
dations:
1. Simplifying and consolidating EMU’s governance 
should be a priority of the incoming EU leadership. 
While the imperatives of ‘hard times’ was an argu-
ment for short-term institutional engineering and 
the multiplication of late night meetings, (relatively) 
calmer times should be used to bring coherence, effi-
ciency and clarity to Europe’s Economic and Mon-
etary Union
2. Abolish the Euro-Summit. Operating in the shadow 
of two more routinized and established institutions 
(the European Council and the Eurogroup), the 
real added-value of Euro-Summits’ is disputed. As 
a matter of fact, the Euro-Summit met only once 
per year over the last four years, proof if any where 
required that it is not that useful a forum as its advo-
cates like to think.
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